about what constitutes libel, incitement, or copyright infringement. Instead, courts must "conduct[] an independent review of the record both to be sure that the speech in question actually falls within the unprotected category and to confine the perimeters of any unprotected category within acceptably narrow limits in an effort to ensure that protected expression will not be inhibited." 5 Lower courts have properly accepted this principle for trial court review on motions for summary judgment and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 6 In theory-a theory the Supreme Court has accepted as a principle of constitutional law-such independent review prevents prejudiced or erroneous deprivation of constitutional rights by factfinders. 7 If a factfinder erroneously concludes that your book infringes someone else's book, the factfinder hasn't just made a legal mistake: It has made a mistake of constitutional magnitude, and has deprived you of your First Amendment right to write your own expression, even when based on another's idea. Courts must, Bose holds, protect against such mistakes by policing factfinders' decisions.
Beyond this, independent review is also supposed to help prevent future mistakes by making the lines in free speech law clearer and more administrable. Judicial review is part of the "evolutionary process of commonlaw adjudication" that "give[s] meaning" to legal rules.' As courts see more cases of a particular type, they can refine the line between protected speech (such as non-obscene art, innocent error, or copying of ideas) and unprotected speech (such as obscenity, punishable libel, or copying of expression). They might create new subrules that clarify the meaning of the rules, for the benefit of both future courts and future speakers. Or they might provide benchmarks against which future courts can compare and contrast new fact patterns.
In Part I, we explain why Bose compels independent review of "substantial similarity of expression" determinations. 9 Though the great majority of circuits
Harper & Row thus suggests that the line between using others' expression and using their ideas is of First Amendment significance. Speech communicating facts and ideas using expression that is substantially similar to someone else's expression is constitutionally unprotected. 24 
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Free Speech and Copyright 2435 communicating the same facts and ideas in other ways, however, is constitutionally protected. 5 And such a dividing line makes good constitutional sense: The free speech principle may tolerate certain limits on how someone expresses an idea or a fact, but-whether one sees the principle as primarily concerned with protecting self-expression, with fostering democratic discourse, or with guarding the marketplace of ideas-it cannot tolerate restrictions on communicating ideas and facts as such. When you express an idea someone else pioneered or discuss facts that others have uncovered, you might be free riding on their hard work, but it's a free ride we must allow. 26 
B. Freedom of Speech and Appellate Review
Speech that copies another's expression is not, of course, the only category of speech unprotected by the Free Speech Clause." 7 Fighting words, obscenity, and libel, for example, are also generally unprotected. For each speech against legal sanction. In this respect, infringing speech is just like the traditional exceptons to First Amendment protection, such as obscenity, defamation, fighting words, threats, child pornography, advocacy of unlawful conduct that's intended and likely to produce imminent lawlessness, publication of saling dates of troop ships, and the like. We don't suggest that infringing speech is "valueless" Like advocacy of unla%%ful conduct, or revelation of extremely sensitive government secrets, it can often be an important contribution to public debate or, at least, public entertainment. It is punishable not because of its perceised lack of value, but because of its perceived harm and the supposedly ample alternative avenues for expression But whateser the reason, the speech is unprotected by the First Amendment against the operation of copynght law Of course, speech that is unprotected against copyright law might still be protected against other laws: The government may not, for instance, constitutionally apply a ban on racist speech or blasphemous speech even to material that's infringing, just as it may not apply a ban on racist speech esen to matenal that constitutes fighting words. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992 (1996) category, the Court has set forth rules defining the category's boundaries: Defamatory statements about public figures, for instance, are actionable only if made with "actual malice"-knowledge or reckless disregard of their falsity.2 But these rules are not self-explanatory, and it's not enough for appellate courts just to announce the rules and leave them to judges and juries to apply. As the Bose Court wrote:
Providing triers of fact with a general description of the type of communication whose content is unworthy of protection has not, in and of itself, served sufficiently to narrow the category, nor served to eliminate the danger that decisions by triers of fact may inhibit the expression of protected ideas. 29 Therefore, the Court has held, courts must independently review judgments that a certain statement is unprotected. In part, this simply prevents unconstitutional results: Because erroneous denial of constitutional protection is a violation of constitutional rights, courts must "exercise [independent] review in order to preserve the precious liberties established and ordained by the Constitution." 3 But beyond that, independent review is also supposed to make the rule clearer for future cases. Independent review should help "confine the perimeters of any unprotected category within acceptably narrow limits in an effort to ensure that protected expression will not be inhibited."'" The content of many Free Speech Clause rules "is not revealed simply by [their] literal text" ;32 instead, the rules must be "given meaning through the evolutionary process of common-law adjudication. 33 Therefore, appellate judges, "as expositors of the Constitution, must independently decide whether the evidence in the record is sufficient to cross the constitutional threshold."
34
If appellate courts review decisions only for clear error, not independently, the "evolutionary process of common-law adjudication" is substantially stunted. Instead of marking out two areas-speech copying ideas and speech copying expression--clear error review marks out three areas: (1) speech that any reasonable factfinder would conclude only copies ideas; (2) speech that any reasonable factfinder would conclude only copies expression; and (3) speech for which reasonable factfinders could disagree about whether it copies ideas or expression. The third area is very big, and decisions that fall within this area give little guidance. A factfinder doesn't get much value from a precedent saying, "Reasonable factfinders could disagree whether speech x is substantially similar in expression to speech y., 35 Likewise, such a precedent gives little guidance to speakers who want to know what they can say and what they can't. As the Court has recognized, when the rules are so vague, many speakers will "steer far wider of the unlawful zone." ' Though Bose was a libel case, its justification for independent review applies equally to copyright law: In both cases, some speech is protected and some is not; in both cases, the factfinder may misclassify the speech as unprotected, erroneously concluding that it was said with actual malice or that it used another's expression; and in both cases, the rule's literal text provides little guidance without case-by-case elaboration. Bose made clear that its rule applies generally, beyond libel, to judgments that a certain kind of speech is unprotected. 37 46. In fact, refining the definition of"substantial similarity of expression" serves the goals of copyright law as well as of the First Amendment: "Because copyright law ultimately serves the purpose of enriching the general public through access to creative works, it is peculiarly important that the boundaries of copyright law be demarcated as clearly as possible." Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 527 (1994 55. This is probably ight for probative similanty. though not for substantial similanty Cf supra note 9 (distinguishing the two). The failure of many courts to distinguish clearly between these two kinds of similarity may help explain why they use clear error review for both.
hold that such mixed questions should generally be reviewed de novo, and that Rule 52(a) 56 dictates clear error review only for purely factual questions. 5 7 General jury verdicts, however, are always reviewed deferentially unless the Constitution commands otherwise."
How would a de novo standard work in practice? Say a factfinder finds that a defendant's work is substantially similar in its expression to the plaintiff's work. And say the court of appeals, applying independent judgment, disagrees. This decision will then become a benchmark against which future courts-and, better yet, future creators and publishers-can compare and contrast their cases. Of course, no two fact patterns are identical, but the data points may add up. As the Supreme Court said when adopting an independent review standard for similarly vague Fourth Amendment probable cause determinations, "[E]ven where one case may not squarely control another one, the two decisions when viewed together may usefully add to the body of law on the subject." 5 9 With each new binding decision, the rule becomes a little clearer.
Independent judgment review need not-and cannot-reexamine all the factual findings involved in the lower court's decision. The appellate court may, for instance, defer to the factfinder's judgments about witness credibility.' In jury cases, the court will generally have to assume that the jurors believed the winning side's factual claims. But even if this is done, the question will remain: Accepting the winner's story about the historical facts, are the two works substantially similar in their expression? The appellate court can make this decision at least as well as a jury or a trial judge. 6 t 56. FED R. Civ. P. 52(a) ("Findings of fact... shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses.").
57 Skeptics may suggest that, in practice, the standard of review matters little-that judges will manipulate the standard to reach the results they want.
We disagree. Doubtless such manipulation sometimes happens, but in our experience courts generally do take the standard of review seriously. Courts certainly say that standards of review matter, 62 and it seems that standards of review must sometimes make a difference. 6 3 Without independent judgment review, binding precedents are set only when a court concludes that no reasonable factfinder could find liability or fail to find liability. By definition, this happens only in rather extreme cases--cases in which a court could find that a jury would have to be, in one judge's words, "drunk or crazy" to conclude that the defendant's speech was substantially similar in its expression to the plaintiff's,' a hard standard to meet. Thus, unless courts use independent judgment review, the line between what's allowed and what's forbidden will rarely be made clearer for future cases.
D. Appellate Review in Cases Won by Defendants
Bose did leave a significant question unresolved: Is independent judgment review proper if the defendant wins at trial? The lower courts are split on this. Some courts stress that independent judgment review aims at developing and refining the constitutional rules. 65 This development would happen regardless of who won below, which suggests that independent judgment review should apply symmetrically. Other courts stress Bose's other rationale: that appellate review decreases the chances that constitutionally protected speech would be erroneously punished. Under this view, when the free speech claimant wins below, there's no risk that the factfinder has erroneously abridged a constitutional right. 66 Indeed, independent appellate review in this situation increases the chance of erroneously punishing protected speech (though it decreases the chance of erroneously protecting unprotected speech). Moreover, the argument goes, courts can't adopt independent judgment review just for prudential reasons. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) for bench trials, and the Seventh Amendment for jury trials, appellate courts must review factual findings for clear error.
In our view, independent judgment review of the idea-expression decision is valuable even when the defendant won at trial: Whoever won, independent review should produce more refinement of the legal standard, something Bose says is constitutionally valuable. Moreover, a symmetric rule is fairer to plaintiffs. Copyright plaintiffs' claims are not claims of constitutional right, but they are certainly important; as Harper & Row pointed out, copyright law itself serves First Amendment goals. 67 For review of bench trials, the symmetric approach can be used whether or not one concludes that Bose requires it as a constitutional matter; as we mentioned above, most circuits hold that decisions involving application of law to fact may be reviewed de novo without running afoul of Rule 52(a). 6 " And the rationale for reviewing mixed questions de novo-that questions that involve "strik[ing] a balance between two sometimes conflicting societal values" and that are therefore "of clear precedential importance" 69 should be decided by appellate courts-applies well in the copyright context. Independent judgment review probably can't work, regardless of how one reads Bose, when the court is reviewing a jury's general verdict for a defendant. Copyright claims involve subsidiary factual inquiries. When the The same principles apply when trial courts review motions for summary judgment and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. In such cases, our analysis suggests that the court must independently decide whether the two works are indeed substantially similar in their expression, and not just whether a reasonable jury could so find.
This makes sense, doctrinally, practically, and theoretically. Doctrinally, federal courts have held that the Bose reasoning applies to decisions on summary judgment 7 2 and motion for j.n.o.v." Practically, for j.n.o.v. Some of these cases apply Bose on appellate review of a tral cour's summary judgment decision. For the reasons we give in this subsection, it would make no sense to apply a different standard to the trial court's decision itself.
73. See, e.g., Crowder v. Housing Auth., 990 F.2d 586. 594 n.15 (11th Cir. 1993) (stating that the "plaintiff was entitled-under ordinary Federal Rules standards (and even more in the light of Bose's admonition to judges about mixed questions of law and facty---to a judgment as a matter of law on most motions, the court of appeals would review the matter independently in any event, assuming an appeal were filed. There's no reason to deny the losing party this independent review until the appellate court rules; and providing this review up front might be more likely to reach the right result even when no appeal is filed. 74 The same goes for summary judgment: If, resolving all the underlying factual claims in the movant's favor, the court still concludes that there's no sufficient similarity of expression, there's no reason to delay this judgment until the j.n.o.v. motion or until review by the court of appeals. In fact, having trial courts review the evidence deferentially and then having appellate courts review it independently would lead to needless reversals, reversals which might have been avoided if the trial courts reviewed the evidence independently to begin with.
Theoretically, at least one of the underlying principles of Bose applies fully to trial court review: Trial courts as well as courts of appeals have a duty to prevent erroneous denials of constitutional protection. The other principle-the notion that judicial decisions can help clarify the law-is somewhat less applicable, but still retains considerable force. In copyright practice, district court decisions, if published, are often quite influential: 75 Because copyright lawsuits are mainly about money, losing parties often settle or just give up rather than appeal. District court decisions that something is or is not, as a matter of law, infringement can thus be important benchmarks that help "give[] meaning [to the rules] through the evolutionary process of common-law adjudication. 76 In any event, as the cases cited above show, the principle that Bose generally applies on summary judgment and motion for j.n.o.v. is well entrenched in the case law. The burden is on those who would carve out a special copyright exception. For the reasons we discuss in the next part, we are skeptical that this burden can be met.
F. Lawyers Should at Least Ask for Independent Review
Whether or not the above claims are sure winners, they are at least colorable enough that lawyers who lose at trial ought to raise them. Stare decisis doesn't prevent courts from adopting this approach, even if they have 74. It is, of course, possible that the district court's independent review would reach one result and the court of appeals's independent review would reach another, in retrospect, then, one might say that the district court's independent review was a waste of time. But unless the substantial-similarity-of-expression test is indeed entirely indeterminate, we would assume that by and large the district court and the court of appeals would come to the same, one hopes correct, conclusion.
75. Those skeptical about this might check out any copyright casebook or treatise, and see how many of the leading cases discussed there are district court cases.
76. Bose v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 502 (1984) .
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[Vol. 107: 2431 in the past reviewed substantial-similarity-of-expression findings only for clear error; none of the cases adopting a clear error standard considered Bose. When a new argument is raised that wasn't considered in a prior case, a court isn't bound by the prior decision." And our proposal is hardly radical: As we discuss below, in Subsection II.B.4, some circuits have indeed accepted independent review-though not on constitutional grounds-with no obvious ill effects.
II. IS COPYRIGHT DIFFERENT?
So far, we have argued: (1) that copyright law restricts speech, but speech that copies another's expression is constitutionally unprotected; (2) that the Court in Bose mandated independent review of judgments that a particular instance of speech falls into a constitutionally unprotected category; and (3) that independent review is therefore required for judgments that a particular instance of speech copies another's expression.
But might copyright law somehow differ from other speech restrictions (libel law, obscenity law, and the like), and thus deserve different treatment? We have certainly heard this view from many, and especially from copyright lawyers. Though copyright law is clearly a speech restriction, to many it lacks that speech restriction flavor. It doesn't sound like censorship, only private people lawfully enforcing their property rights. Still, while many have this intuition, the question remains: Is there some specific reason underlying it, some reason that can justify setting aside the normal First Amendment procedural guarantees?
A. The First Amendment Interest
Property Rights
The argument that copyright law should be immune from standard First Amendment procedural rules because it protects property rights strikes us as a non sequitur. 78 Free speech guarantees can't be avoided simply by characterizing a speech restriction as an "intellectual property law." After all, one could plausibly view libel law as protecting a person's property interest Of course, we don't deny that property laws are sometimes relevant to analyzing free speech claims: The First Amendment does not, for instance, license people to trespass on private real estate in order to speak. 82 But trespass laws are generally applicable to all conduct, speech or not, and operate without regard to the communicative impact of the speech; it makes sense not to view them as general speech restrictions for purposes of the independent review doctrine. But content-based laws, specifically targeted at speech, must be seen as speech restrictions, whether or not one frames them as "property" rules. They may be substantively valid speech restrictions, but our calling them property rules doesn't justify exempting them from the normal First Amendment procedural principles. This is especially so when they ban people from saying a particular thing anywhere, at any time, and not just on others' private property.
Private Enforcement
Copyright law is largely enforced by private litigation, not government prosecution, so one might argue that it is much less likely to turn into an engine of censorship. But of course libel law is also enforced almost entirely by private litigation. Despite this, libel law is understood to be a governmentimposed restriction, 83 even if the regime of private enforcement makes it a little harder for the government to use the restriction as part of a coherent censorship campaign. 84 
Content Neutrality
Nor is intellectual property law content neutral and therefore (as some have argued) 85 subject to laxer rules. To begin with, independent review is still required in cases involving content-neutral restrictions.6 But beyond this, copyright liability turns on the content of what is published. True, the law draws no ideological distinctions; just like libel laws, obscenity laws, and fighting-words laws, copyright law applies equally to speech advocating democracy, speech advocating communism, and speech with no ideological message at all. But while this might make the law viewpoint neutral, it doesn't make it content neutral, 87 and doesn't warrant ignoring the Bose rule.
Subject Matter of the Jeopardized Speech
One might suggest that copyright lawsuits pose little threat to free speech 
It's All the Cost of Doing Business
Many copyrights-especially those that actually end up in litigation-are exploited by fairly large businesses. One might argue that the chilling effect of legal uncertainty is less of a problem when lawsuits are just a cost of doing business; Twentieth-Century Fox, the argument might go, just isn't going to be very chilled by the risk of copyright litigation. 93 But this in no way differentiates copyright from libel law. Most libel defendants are also large businesses, whose job is reporting and whose business interests in many respects counteract any chilling effect the law could have. Still, we worry that libel lawsuits might lead even the richest newspapers to soft-pedal certain issues: Even wealthy entities that can afford a lawsuit might still be reluctant to face one; businesses try hard to minimize their costs of doing business.
The same goes for copyright cases. A movie studio may be able to bear the costs of litigation over, say, a docudrama that's similar to another story based on the same set of facts, but this doesn't mean that the studio will be willing to bear this cost. It might decide to do another story instead-perhaps no great loss to the world, but no less a loss than in the typical libel situation.
Copyright Law Furthers Free Speech Values
Nor can copyright law be exempted from the general Bose rule because "copyright itself [can] be the engine of free expression." 94 Copyright law's speech-enhancing effect, coupled with its specific constitutional authorization,' justifies holding copyright law to be a substantively valid 96 speech restriction. But procedural rules, such as the independent review has always been held to be of high constitutional value. 
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[Vol. 107: 2431 requirement, exist to make sure that even substantively valid speech restrictions don't end up restricting speech that should remain protected. Moreover, independent appellate review would not in any event greatly diminish the incentive provided by copyright law, just as such review does not greatly diminish the force of libel law or obscenity law. Refining the substantial-similarity-of-expression test actually fits well with copyright policy as well as with First Amendment law: "Because copyright law ultimately serves the purpose of enriching the general public through access to creative works, it is peculiarly important that the boundaries of copyright law be demarcated as clearly as possible." ' 97 If anything, the premise that copyright law furthers free speech values makes it especially important tha: copyright cases be accurately decided, since error in either direction (too much protection or too little) implicates a First Amendment interest. If Bose is correct-if independent appellate review is important to correct unconstitutional results and to refine the rules, thus reducing the risk of such errors in the future-then independent review is doubly valuable for copyright cases.
We are also generally skeptical of distinguishing supposedly speechfurthering restrictions from other restrictions. Many kinds of speech restrictions may be seen as furthering speech in some way. Justice White made this argument about libel law, claiming that "virtually unrestrained defamatory remarks about private citizens will discourage them from speaking out and concerning themselves with social problems." 98 Some have likewise argued that pornography tends to "silence" women, which might suggest that obscenity law may serve First Amendment values.' Similarly, Justice Jackson argued that bans on strident public denunciations of a religion may serve First Amendment religious freedom values.' I°S ome contend that these arguments justify substantive speech restrictions and some contend the opposite. 10 ' Regardless of how one comes down on this question, however, the arguments do not justify exemption from the normal procedural rules that make sure the substantive rules are accurately applied. And in any event, copyright law's supposed speech-enhancing effects cannot justify a special exemption for copyright law alone. 
The Copyright and Patent Clause
The Constitution specifically refers to the government interest underlying copyright law: Article I, Section 8 authorizes Congress "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."'" Harper & Row mentioned this as one reason that copyright law is a constitutionally permissible speech restriction. 3 But the existence of congressional power under the Copyright and Patent Clause can't exempt copyright law from all First Amendment scrutiny. The point of the Bill of Rights is to restrain the federal government in the exercise of its enumerated powers: For instance, the government has the enumerated power to run the post office, but this doesn't mean it can refuse to carry communist propaganda.'4 Likewise, in exercising its copyright power, Congress is bound by the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments. 5 Copyright law must likewise be bound by the First Amendment.
We agree that it would be unsound to read the First Amendment as entirely eliminating the copyright power created by the Framers only two years earlier.' 6 The Copyright and Patent Clause does represent the Framers' judgment that "copyright itself [can] be the engine of free expression,"'°7 so courts ought not, in their zeal to protect speech, eviscerate the incentive that copyright law provides. This was good reason for Harper & Row to conclude that copyright law is substantively constitutional. But it hardly shows that copyright law ought to be free of the traditional procedural protections available in all other First Amendment cases.' Independent appellate review 102 Cir. 1990 ) ("Since the Copyright Act is the congressional implementation of a constitutional directive to encourage inventors by protecting their exclusive rights in their discoveries, copyright interests also must be guarded under the Constitution, and injunctive relief is a common judicial response to infringement of a valid copyright (despite the normal First Amendment due process rule against prior restraints]."); I RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 15:58, at 15-88 (3d ed. 1996) (stating that "the fact that copyright protection is itself a value of constitutional dimension, vindicating the directive of the Constitution's Copyright Clause" justifies the issuance of injunctions).
104. See [Vol. 107: 2431 would not eviscerate or even greatly diminish the incentive provided by copyright law, just as it does not eviscerate libel law or obscenity law. It would merely require that the law be enforced in a slightly different way.
Importance of the Government Interest
Finally, one might correctly point out that the interest upheld by copyright law-the interest in providing an incentive for disseminating ideas-is, even without regard to its constitutional status, quite important. We do not doubt that this is so, but lots of speech restrictions are justified by important interests. Preventing incitement to imminent violence is surely an important interest, too, as are protecting individual reputation" 9 and combatting child pornography." 0 Yet independent review applies in each of these cases."' Independent review doesn't prevent these interests from being served; it just requires that they be served through a certain set of procedures.
B. Is Trying To Refine the Idea-Expression Dichotomy Pointless?
The first foundation for Bose review-the normative obligation to protect speech from erroneous restriction-thus applies to copyright law as well as it does to libel law, obscenity law, and all the other areas where Bose review is required. The heart of any assertion that Bose ought not apply to copyright cases must be a claim that the second justification-that independent review will help the rule evolve through case-by-case adjudication-is simply factually incorrect for copyright cases: that, as Judge Learned Hand suggested, decisions about substantial similarity of expression "must ... inevitably be ad hoc," and the test must therefore be "of necessity vague. ' "1 " 2 Perhaps common law adjudication cannot give the line more meaning than the words themselves offer. Perhaps ultimately each factfinder must draw the line anew, based on its own notions of what is an "idea" and what is "expression." Perhaps new subrules and benchmark decisions are useless.
We think there is a kernel of truth to this argument, but not enough to justify departing from Bose. True, the idea-expression dichotomy is necessarily vague, and additional refinement by appellate decisions will not make it vastly clearer. Still, the appellate decisionmaking that independent review makes possible will probably provide some extra clarity, some extra guidance for litigants and lower courts. This, coupled with the normative argument we have presented above, is enough to warrant following Bose even in copyright cases. We come to this conclusion based on four sources of evidence, which we discuss in succeeding subsections:
(1) Copyright decisions often do compare and contrast the facts in a case with the facts in prior cases. Decisions that determine whether two items are substantially similar in their expression-rather than just deciding whether such a conclusion is clearly erroneous-are thus of significant precedential value.
(2) Lawyers likewise seem to rely somewhat on prior case law.
(3) The Supreme Court has accepted that independent review is valuable even where, as here, the substantive rule is fact-intensive and the precedentbuilding benefits of independent review are not likely to be very large. While the Court may have erred on this-or perhaps even generally erred in Bosethe Court's considered judgment in these cases deserves respect.
(4) While there may be some costs to independent review, some circuits have adopted it (for reasons other than the ones we suggest) with no obvious ill effects. Likewise, all circuits generally independently review fair use findings, again with little trouble.
Points one and two suggest that independent review may be practically beneficial. Point three suggests that even a small benefit may be adequate to justify it. Point four suggests that independent review is unlikely to be harmful. This evidence is tentative, and we are not sure how one could get more definitive evidence. Still, given the Court's ruling in Bose, the burden of proof should be on those who want to carve out a copyright exception. Absent such a showing, fidelity to the rules requires that Bose be followed; independent appellate review is therefore the sounder result.
Lower Courts' Use of Prior Cases as Benchmarks
Despite the supposedly ad hoc nature of each idea-expression decision, courts do look to benchmark cases in deciding whether two works are substantially similar in their expression. Durham Industries, Inc. v. Tomy Corp.," 3 a case dealing with alleged infringement of copyrights in games, dolls, and toys, is a good example. The Durham court acknowledged that "'[g]ood eyes and common sense may be as useful as deep study of... cases, which themselves are tied to highly particularized facts."' 4 But the court went on to say: "[W]e have nevertheless consulted the cases dealing with toys and dolls in order to check both our eyes and our sense." ' " 5 Indeed, the court cited eleven cases on similar subjects, briefly noting degrees of similarity. The court acknowledged that the plaintiff's and defendant's dolls were similar in that they walked or crawled, were small and made of plastic, and had "full Collectively, Eckes, Kregos, and Key Publications show the Second Circuit erecting fairly detailed guideposts to help draw the idea-expression line in factual compilation cases. Selecting 5000 out of 18,000 baseball cards as being of premium value is copyrightable expression.'" Choosing 9000 businesses for a business guide and arranging them into categories is expression, but creating another business guide with substantially different selections and arrangements takes only the idea, not the expression.'2 Putting together nine kinds of statistics on pitchers is just enough to qualify for protection, but that protection is limited to near exact copying.' Together these cases give 116 128 Jay Robert Nash published many books claiming that John Dillinger was not actually killed in a shootout with FBI agents; instead, Nash's theory went, a look-alike was shot in his place, and Dillinger laid low and survived for many decades. An episode of the TV show Simon and Simon was based on this idea, and Nash sued for copyright infringement. The district court granted summary judgment for CBS, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed.
In his opinion, Judge Easterbrook pointed out that the existing tests for distinguishing ideas from expression "do[] little to help resolve a given case," 1 29 and observed that "[a]fter 200 years of wrestling with copyright questions, it is unlikely that courts will come up with the answer any time soon, if indeed there is 'an' answer, which we doubt."' ' 30 Easterbrook analyzed how providing either too little or too much protection might discourage production of new works, then wrote that courts "must muddle through, using not a fixed rule but a sense of the consequences of moving dramatically in either direction."' 3 ' Despite these concerns, the Nash court did look to earlier cases as benchmarks: It compared the fact pattern to that in Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 32 which found no infringement because there was substantial similarity only of facts and not of expression, and to that in Toksvig v. Bruce Publishing Co. ,1 3 which found infringement because the expression was substantially similar. The prior cases did create law that gave some guidance in a future case.
Of course, these cases, and others like them,' 34 are hardly conclusive proof that independent appellate review is worth the candle. Courts might just be citing the precedents as post hoc rationalizations of whatever view they held to begin with. Or perhaps the precedents do provide useful benchmarks-and are therefore useful predictors-but only to a small degree; perhaps each new precedent is helpful only in a few cases, and even then only to set a mood rather than to provide a definite answer. [Vol. 107: 2431Nonetheless, the cases do undercut the strong claim that each copyright case is sui generis. Judges at least assert that past decisions are helpful in deciding future ones. Precedents do seem to "confine the perimeters"' 3 of the idea-expression dichotomy, to "mark[] out the limits of the standard through the process of case-by-case adjudication,"'3 6 to "give[] meaning" to the rule "through the evolutionary process of common-law adjudication.""' And the Court itself accepts the notion that litigation may help "the boundaries of copyright law [to] be demarcated as clearly as possible."'
1
The magnitude of this clarifying effect is unclear. If Bose had never existed, and if the Court were deciding solely on pragmatic grounds whether to adopt independent appellate review in copyright cases, we might conclude that the clarifying effect is too speculative to justify independent review. But the Court has mandated independent review, because of both the supposed lawclarifying benefits of such review and the perceived constitutional value of an extra look in cases involving free speech rights. Given this, Bose must be followed unless there is strong reason to believe that its reasoning is mistaken in copyright cases. The cases we discuss in this subsection suggest that there is no such strong reason.
Lawyers' Use of Prior Cases as Benchmarks
Another possible check on whether the Supreme Court's intuitions apply to copyright cases is the view of experienced lawyers. Theory that sounds good in the ivory tower, or to the Justices, may nevertheless end up failing on the streets.
We are conscious of the great difficulty, perhaps even impossibility, of any scientific empirical work in this area. Even if we could ask a large enough sample of lawyers their views on the question, we would get only a general sense of lawyers' beliefs (as filtered through the particular text of the questions we asked). These beliefs might not quite match reality; they might not even reveal the lawyers' likely actions; in fact, because many lawyers do not often consciously think about standards of review, they may not have any settled beliefs on the subject at all.
Nonetheless, we thought it worthwhile to talk to a handful of experienced lawyers to get a sense of their views-a reality check against the judgment of several expert practitioners. If, for instance, all of them had firmly told us that prior case law was useless in predicting future cases, this would have led us to think twice about our conclusions. obviously not a scientific survey of any sort-the sample size is laughably small, and the questions are open-ended-but it may provide some insight into how at least some lawyers react to cases. When we asked the lawyers generally how they would predict what a court would do-without specifically raising the possibility of comparing a case against precedents14'-we got a range of answers. Some lawyers mentioned case law, among other things. 42 Others initially stressed that it is a matter of judgment. 4 3 Blaine Greenberg reported that he presents nonlawyers in his office with the two items and asks for their reactions.
When asked explicitly whether they would look to prior cases,'" those who didn't initially mention them split on their usefulness. Bob Osterberg stated that he would turn to those cases he knows and do research on cases outside his core field (music). Herb Schwartz reported that he would look to cases, but "cases only take you so far in this area." Greenberg would look to cases "only if we had a very specific area where I thought it had case law that goes to it," stressing the fact-specific nature of the question.
The lawyers could think of few ways to make it easier to predict likely results. 45 Schwartz remarked that "it's like pornography, unfortunately. ' "' 4 6
They split over whether having more benchmark cases would help.' 47 Tom Hemnes thought that benchmark cases help in more established media, but that courts have trouble in more unusual areas. Greenberg said that "the more information that exists and the more published opinions there are, the better off you are. But the more cases decided, the more likely it is that you can find a rationale for your argument because not all courts are going to agree." Peter Nolan agreed that courts sometimes disagree and noted that benchmark cases only help "if you have something very akin to your situation." Osterberg thought more benchmarks might be useful in some areas, though he believed that in his area (literary property) there were plenty. On the other hand, Schwartz doubted that more benchmark cases would increase predictability. David Nimmer, meanwhile, thought there were plenty of cases; indeed, he said, "maybe it would make life easier if there were fewer benchmark cases."
These responses reflect, sometimes simultaneously, two conflicting views on the accumulation of precedent. One view holds that the buildup of precedent makes the law clearer, more detailed, and more predictable. The other view sees case law becoming more chaotic, as courts with different outlooks find ways to distinguish cases with close facts.
Most of the lawyers distinguished how they use district court and circuit court precedents.1 48 This is partly because circuit cases are mandatory precedent, but there are other reasons as well. Greenberg felt that district courts were less predictable than circuit courts.' 49 As for using cases from the other circuits, the lawyers differed. Osterberg said that even cases from other circuit courts "get more attention and respect" than do district court cases. Nolan had a similar opinion, noting that, among other things, circuit cases involve three judges, thereby pooling the accumulated legal experience and wisdom of more people. Nimmer and Schwartz were less inclined to pay attention to cases from other circuits.
When asked whether they treat circuit court cases reviewing summary judgments differently from those reviewing the results of trials,' the lawyers gave varying answers. Nimmer said he treats them differently "only to predict if this is a case that's right for summary judgment." Greenberg agreed, saying that if a case survives summary judgment and gets to trial, "then I would advise the client that I think the equitable appeal of the case will be a stronger determinant than the case law." Schwartz endorsed a view closer to ours, saying "denials of summary judgment don't tell you a lot. Granting summary judgment is a pretty extreme case. So trials tell you more."
On the points most closely tied to this Essay, most of the lawyers do not pay attention to whether circuit court cases used de novo review or clear error 148. See infra Appendix, Question 6. 149. As he put it, "Trial judges are such strong personalities that they don't care what their brethren will do. It wouldn't surprise me if some cases would go ten different ways depending on who you draw.... But if the case can go to the Ninth Circuit, and if the circuit is consistent. I may anticipate winning at the appellate level."
150. See infra Appendix, Question 7.
review. 5 ' Hemnes, however, said that "if the court holds a decision is not clearly erroneous but has dicta saying it is questionable and it might hold differently under a different posture, then I treat clear error cases differently.
Usually the court will make that clear." And Osterberg did say that he "would tend to give greater weight to decisions using de novo review." When asked whether they were aware of differences among circuits in the standard of review, 52 a few had some sense of differences, but none had any detailed awareness. When asked about general differences among circuits, 53 Hemnes said the following:
[T]he circuits that address this comparatively infrequently are harder to predict than those which have a long track record. At the most extreme, the Second Circuit is pretty predictable.... On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit is a puzzle to me. You'd think they would have a lot of experience, but they are less predictable to me. It may be that they are struggling with less traditional media.
Some of the lawyers did think that the standard of review a court employs might affect their decision whether or not to appeal a trial court's holding." De novo review should make losing parties more likely to appeal.' 5 Not all, however, thought the standard of review would affect their decision whether to appeal.' 56 Our informal inquiry therefore suggests that these practicing lawyers have not particularly considered the effects of appellate review standards on copyright litigation, the issue on which we focus in this Essay. Some of them share the view that copyright cases are quite fact-specific and that good judgment rather than specific case law is a lawyer's most important guide. But at least a few of them think that more benchmark cases, particularly on close fact patterns, would make outcomes more predictable. Moreover, the lawyers generally agree that circuit court opinions are more useful than trial court opinions. The judgments of these expert practitioners thus reinforce our view that devices that force circuit courts to produce more detailed, useful opinions could be of some help. De novo appellate review is one such device. 155. Greenberg, for example, said that "if there is de novo review, you've got a much better chance of winning. If there is de novo review, we'd be more likely to appeal, and more likely to be interested in what the court of appeals had done on these cases." Nimmer said he "should be" influenced by the standard of review: "If the standard is de novo, and I think it's a good case for my client, I should appeal. If it is clear error and the judge preserved the record, then I'm sunk."
156. Schwartz denied that the standard of review would have an effect. Nolan said that "if it were de novo I'm more likely to go up. But unless a pile of money is involved we would not appeal, we would settle. It's too costly to appeal." He said he uses appeals mainly to establish legal principles.
The Supreme Court's Views in Other Areas
Case law and interviews with lawyers thus suggest that extra precedents may be of some, albeit limited, value. Is this limited benefit sufficient to justify independent review? The Supreme Court has recently confronted this question in other constitutional contexts, and has generally come down in favor of independent review even when the law-clarifying benefits of such review are modest.
The most recent case, Ornelas v. United States, 57 involved review of reasonable suspicion and probable cause conclusions in Fourth Amendment cases. These are fact-intensive, totality-of-the-circumstances inquiries, and the Court began by stressing the complexity of the issues involved:
Articulating precisely what "reasonable suspicion" and "probable cause" mean is not possible. They are commonsense, non-technical conceptions that deal with "'the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act."' As such, the standards are "not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules." ... They are ... fluid concepts that take their substantive content from the particular contexts in which the standards are being assessed.' 58 Despite this, the Court held that independent appellate review was required:
[T]he legal rules for probable cause and reasonable suspicion acquire content only through application. Independent review is therefore necessary if appellate courts are to maintain control of, and to clarify[,J the legal principles.... [W] here the "relevant legal principle can be given meaning only through its application to the particular circumstances of a case, the Court has been reluctant to give the trier of fact's conclusions presumptive force and, in so doing, strip a federal appellate court of its primary function as an expositor of law" .....
Finally, de novo review tends to unify precedent and will come closer to providing law enforcement officers with a defined "'set of rules which, in most instances, makes it possible to reach a correct determination beforehand as to whether an invasion of privacy is justified in the interest of law enforcement."' . . . "IT]he law declaration aspect of independent review potentially may guide police, unify precedent, and stabilize the law .... "
It is true that because the mosaic which is analyzed for a reasonable-suspicion or probable-cause inquiry is multi-faceted, "one determination will seldom be a useful 'precedent' for another. control another one, the two decisions when viewed together may usefully add to the body of law on the subject. 59 The Court took a similar approach in Thompson v. Keohane,1 6 0 where it confronted the proper standard of review on habeas corpus of state court determinations regarding whether a person was "in custody" for Miranda v. Arizona' 6 ' purposes. The Thompson Court acknowledged that the inquiry had a "'totality of the circumstances' cast,' ' t62 and that appellate decisions might not be able to "supply 'a definite rule. ' "1 6 3 It concluded, however, that "'in custody' determinations do guide future decisions"; 6 that though such determinations cannot create definite rules, "they nonetheless can reduce the area of uncertainty"; 6 5 and that they may "unify (1988) , which dealt with whether the government's position in litigation was substantially justified for purposes of determining Equal Access to Justice Act fee awards. In both cases, the Court held that deferential review was required because the fact patterns involved "'multifarious, fleeting, special, narrow facts that utterly resist generalization"' and that independent appellate review could not "clarify the underlying principles of law." Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 404-05 (quoting Pierce, 487 U.S. at 560-62 (quoting Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1965))). Unfortunately, the Court has not explained exactly why it treated Ornelas and Thompson differently from Cooter & Gell and Pierce; the best explanation seems to be that the latter cases involved nonconstitutional matters that were peripheral to the merits.
168. See Miller, 474 U.S. at 114, 116-17 (citing cases that mandate deferential review in certain habeas corpus contexts).
169. Of course, decisions about whether the defendant used the plaintiff's work or whether the defendant's work is an entirely independent creation often turn on credibility judgments. This, however, is an analytically separate inquiry from the decision whether a plaintiff's expression is substantially similar to a defendant's expression. 177 we know that parodies commenting on the works from which they borrow are favored uses akin to commentary or news reporting. Other cases refine the test further. " [T] he evolutionary process of common-law adjudication" 78 seems to work for fair use, which leads us to suspect that it might also work (or at least not cause enough harm to justify disregarding Bose) for substantial similarity of expression.
C. Against Special Pleading for Copyright
We thus see no compelling normative reason to treat copyright differently from other speech restrictions, restrictions that are likewise substantively valid, but nonetheless require certain procedural safeguards. There is some practical reason to be skeptical of Bose's utility, but the arguments against applying Bose aren't enough to avoid its precedential force.
And we see good reason not to treat copyright more favorably than other speech restrictions. The First Amendment demands sacrifices from many who earnestly believe in the legitimacy of their favorite speech restrictions. This burden is always heavy, but it seems heavier still when others' speech restrictions-especially restrictions that, like copyright law, are identified with the relatively rich and powerful-are given a free ride. 475, 484 (1996) ("Powerful actors like government agencies, the writers' lobby, industries, and so on have always been successful at coining free speech 'exceptions' to suit their interest-copyright, false advertising, words of threat, defamation, libel, plagiarism, words of monopoly, and many others. But the strength of the interest behind these exceptions seems no less than that of a black undergraduate subjected to vicious abuse while walking late at night on campus."); Richard Delgado & David H. Yun, Pressure Valves and Bloodied Chickens: An Analysis of Paternalistic Objections to Hate Speech Regulation, 82 CAL. L. REV. 871, 892 (1994) ("Perhaps... in twenty or fifty years we will look upon hate speech rules with the same equanimity with which we now view defamation, forgery, obscenity, copyright, and dozens of other exceptions to the free speech principle, and wonder why in the late twentieth century we resisted them so strongly.").
oppose suggested new exceptions to the First Amendment defend their support for the old exceptions.
Any special preference for copyright law must thus be justified by some substantial difference between copyright and other speech restrictions. Where, as here, no such difference exists, favoritism for a particular kind of speech restriction risks corroding public respect for First Amendment law more generally. And, ironically, publishers and producers-the very people who often benefit from the way copyright law now ignores First Amendment protections-have the most to lose from any corrosion of First Amendment protection outside copyright. 1Si
Ill. RECONSIDERING BosE?
Thus, Bose constitutionally requires independent judgment review of ideaexpression conclusions. There is simply no good justification for carving out a special exception for copyright cases. And yet, we suspect that quite a few readers, especially copyright lawyers, may still conclude that the majority of circuits is right and that independent review is wrong. Independent review would impose a burden, both on litigants and the appellate system: It would require appellate courts to spend more time on each appeal t 1 2 and might encourage more litigants to appeal,' 83 thus delaying final decisions and consuming more court time and litigant money. In contrast, the benefits that independent review would provide seem somewhat speculative.
These arguments, however, would apply not just to independent review in copyright cases, but to the Bose rule generally, which makes this a good opportunity to ask whether Bose might be mistaken. We won't engage in a complete analysis here, but we will briefly sketch how such an argument might go and what it would mean for First Amendment law more broadly.
Any system of justice administered by humans has imperfections. Factfinders might be biased or simply wrong. Rules will not be perfectly well defined, which increases the risk of factfinder bias in applying the rules and leads cautious people to "steer far wider of the unlawful zone."'" 181. We are indebted to Doug Laycock for this point. 182. See United States v. McConney, 728 F2d 1195, 1201 n.7 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (-It can hardly be disputed that application of a non-deferential standard of review requires a greater investment of appellate resources than does application of the clearly erroneous standard. Appellate courts could do their work more quickly if they applied the clearly erroneous standard in most circumstances. because the courts then need only determine if the lower court's decision is a reasonable one, not substitute their own judgment for that of the trial judge.").
183. We suspect that plaintiffs and defendants will differ more tn thetr estimates of success under independent review than in their estimates of success under deferential revtew. If this is so, then settlement will be less likely. See FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) advisory committee note to 1985 amendments (stating that independent appellate review "tend[s] to ... multiply appeals by encouraging appellate retral of some factual issues").
184. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958).
Normal, nonconstitutional law reacts with some equanimity to these imperfections. Sure, judges and juries sometimes get matters wrong, but that's life. Sure, the law is vague, but we can't demand perfect clarity in our complex world. Perhaps the vagueness creates something of a chilling effect, but that effect is unavoidable, tolerable, and not really too great; people are, after all, used to uncertainty and risk, and they are unlikely to overreact to it. Life is uncertain, and the law, to use a phrase one of us has often heard from his father, "is as vague as life itself."' We might as well deal with it.
One could easily imagine a constitutional jurisprudence that imposed some substantive restraints-for instance, a requirement that libel law allow truth as a defense,' 86 or even a requirement that public figures suing over statements of public concern prove "actual malice"' 87 -but then left the law largely alone. Such a system wouldn't trouble itself over independent review; mistakes happen, rules are vague, but that's just too bad. Nor would such a system put restrictions on preliminary injunctions, quanta of proof, burdens of proof, or what have you.
This approach appears in some of Justice White's libel opinions. White consistently endorsed New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,' 88 but he was skeptical of further constitutionalizing libel law. He was, for instance, unpersuaded that strict liability for falsehoods about private citizens was a "realistic threat to the press and its service to the public."' 89 This risk was, to him, subordinate to the normal tort law principle of compensating innocent victims for the deliberate, even if honestly mistaken, actions of a publisher.' 9 0 He did not "fear[] uncontrolled awards of damages by juries" because of his confidence in "the good sense of most jurors" and in the (quite limited) nonconstitutional appellate review mechanisms that would set aside obviously unreasonable verdicts.' 9 ' As to independent review, Justice White largely joined Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Bose, which suggested, among other things, that "the need to shield protected speech from the risk of erroneous fact-finding" does not require independent review of certain issues. 92 The alternative to this view is the "pervasive constitutional concern" approach: a mistrust of the normal-law system and a concern that its imperfections are intolerable in the First Amendment context. Under this view, the risk of factfinder errors, as errors of constitutional dimension, necessitates extra review procedures. The risk of constitutional violations must be minimized, even at the expense of increasing the risk of uncompensated harm. The chilling effects of substantial liability and of vague laws are presumed, even without empirical evidence of their magnitude. Constitutional freedoms are seen as "fragile"' 93 and in need of special procedural protection; "rigorous procedural safeguards" are needed because "the freedoms of expression must be ringed about with adequate bulwarks."' ' The tension between these views is clearly visible in First Amendment jurisprudence, especially libel jurisprudence. It is likewise visible in other areas, such as the death penalty case law, where the Court, not content with just deciding whether the death penalty is substantively constitutional, has concluded that the danger of normal law's imperfections is so great as to justify additional procedural requirements.' 95 The Bose rule rejects the normal-law model. Under most circumstances, Bose acknowledges, Rule 52(a) requires deference to lower courts (at least as to pure questions of fact),1 96 and the Seventh Amendment requires similar deference to juries; 197 but where constitutional liberties are involved, the rule must be different. 19 8 The judgment behind this is partly empirical-courts of appeals will correct factfinder mistakes and refine vague rules through case-bycase adjudication-but primarily normative: Courts of appeals have a constitutional duty to try to correct factfinder mistakes and to try to refine vague rules. The normative value of such attempts at correction and refinement, even if they aren't always practically very helpful, justifies the tangible costs to the judicial system and the litigants. The Court's arguments for adopting the pervasive constitutional concern model strike us as persuasive. Writers who ask, "What may I lawfully write?" Another alternative, proposed by Professor Monaghan, is for courts to use independent review until they believe they have refined the test as much as they can and then shift to reviewing only for clear error. See Monaghan, supra note 29, at 275-76. We are not sure this approach will ultimately work, because it's hard for courts to tell when enough is enough. The standard of review will essentially be up in the air for a long time, with the appellant in each case insisting that there is more refinement possible and thus asking for de novo review, and the appellee arguing that it is now time to switch to clear error review. Still deserve a clearer and better policed standard than manufacturers who ask, "What safety devices does the duty of 'reasonableness' require me to implement?" 1 99 Free speech, as a constitutional right, deserves special protection. Nevertheless, we confess that the experience of copyright law tests those arguments. Copyright law has led a largely normal-law existence, unencumbered with the various procedures the Court has demanded in libel cases, but the sky has not fallen. There might be a chilling effect here and there, with some people steering "far wider of the unlawful zone" 2 " than they otherwise would have and the occasional (or even frequent) unjust verdict, but writers keep writing, and the marketplace of ideas doesn't seem strikingly impoverished. As Part II explains, we believe that none of this justifies treating copyright law differently from other restrictions. Still, it does provoke some skepticism about the Court's insistence on the pervasive constitutional concern model in free speech cases generally.
One purpose of our Essay has been to show that if one believes that independent review ought not be required in copyright cases, the only principled way to avoid this requirement, is to reconsider it on a general basis. If the Court has indeed gone too far in its distrust of the normal-law adjudication process, all those harmed by speech-whether speech that infringes on a copyright, speech that unjustifiably defames, or speech that counsels violence-should be entitled to the benefits of any retrenchment that might be proper.
IV. FIRST AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS AND COPYRIGHT LAW
Finally, we also hope to lead people to think more generally about "First Amendment due process" in copyright cases. Harper & Row upheld copyright law substantively, but that itself tells us little: Libel law, for instance, is also substantively constitutional, but the Court has imposed many procedural requirements for libel cases. While these need not necessarily apply equally to all other speech restrictions, one can credibly argue that they should be so applied. With that in mind, we suggest the following several areas for future research-and litigation.
A. Prior Restraint
Temporary restrictions on speech jus tified merely by the possibility that the speech might be unprotected-as opposed to a judicial finding that the 199. Perhaps the manufacturers also deserve clearer guidelines than the law currently provides; nonetheless, while a considerable amount of uncertainty might have to be tolerated for the manufacturers, less should be tolerated for speakers. 
B. Strict Liability
Laws that impose strict liability for certain kinds of speech have generally been struck down because they would lead to too much self-censorship on the part of cautious speakers and distributors. Thus, even private figure plaintiffs in public concern libel cases must prove at least that the defendant was negligent; 2 similarly, in obscenity cases the government must prove that the defendant knew or should have known the content of the material he was distributing, 2 5 and reasonable mistake as to the age of a subject is a defense in child pornography cases.
0
6 Is copyright law's imposition of strict liability for infringement thus wholly or partly unconstitutional?2"
C. Punitive and Presumed Damages
In public concern libel cases, punitive damages and presumed damages may only be awarded against defendants who told falsehoods knowingly or recklessly. 2 08 In copyright cases, though, statutory damages-which are the rough equivalent of libel's presumed (and perhaps even punitive) damages-The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 107: 2431 may be awarded even against negligent or innocent defendants." 9 Is this unconstitutional? Does the cap of $20,000 per work infringed t° save the law from unconstitutionality? If so, does this suggest that similarly modest presumed damages in libel cases should be allowed even without a finding of "actual malice"?
D. Burden of Proof
In public concern libel cases, the Court has on constitutional grounds required that the plaintiff bear the burden of proving falsehood, though under the common law the defendant had the burden of proving truth. 2 "' Harper & Row strongly suggested that speech constituting fair use, like speech that is defamatory but true, is constitutionally protected. 2 " 2 Does it follow that the burden of proving unfair use must likewise be put on the plaintiff? 2 " 3
E. Quantum of Proof
In public figure libel cases, the plaintiff must prove actual malice by clear and convincing evidence, not just by a preponderance of the evidence. 2 " 4 Some lower courts impose a similar standard for proof of obscenity in civil obscenity injunction cases. 2 " 5 Should such a standard be required for proof of substantial similarity of expression, or of unfair use? 2 " 6
F. Vagueness and Jury Instructions
Independent appellate review, as we have argued, may make clearer copyright law's otherwise vague dividing lines. In particular, independent appellate review of fair use determinations has produced some principles that are clearer than the otherwise fairly indefinite standard set forth in 17 U.S.C. § 107.217 Unfortunately, jury instructions sometimes fail to incorporate these clarifying principles. For instance, the Ninth Circuit Model Jury Instructions say the following:
Defendant contends that defendant made fair use of the copyrighted work for the purpose of (criticism,) (comment,) (news reporting,) (teaching,) (scholarship,) (research,) (other). The defendant has the burden of proving this defense by a preponderance of the evidence. In determining whether the use made of the work was fair, you shall consider the following factors:
1. the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
2. the nature of the copyrighted work; 3. the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole;
4. the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work; and 5. any other factors that bear upon the issue of fair use. 21' Nothing in these instructions captures the gloss placed on these factors by the case law. For example, the instructions nowhere mention the principle that the power of a parody or a review to "impair the market for [the work] by the very effectiveness of its critical commentary" should be ignored under the fourth factor; 21 9 or that the second factor generally deserves little weight in parody cases; 220 or that it is permissible for a parody to use even "the original's 'heart,"' so long as the parody then "depart[s] markedly" from this heart. 22 ' Nor do the instructions give juries any sense for how the factors must be weighed, a sense that judges can get by comparing and contrasting the relative weight of the factors against factors present in previously decided cases. Finally, the fifth factor seems to invite the jury to apply its entirely unguided discretion, perhaps even considering factors-such as the ideology expressed in defendant's work-that it would be unconstitutional to consider. Juries given these instructions may decide cases entirely differently than judges, who are familiar with the precedents. The fair use doctrine, the Supreme Court tells us, is a "First Amendment protection[], 223 so the principles developed in the fair use cases are of constitutional significance; but the jury can't apply these principles if it doesn't hear about them.
224
Courts should, of course, use the model instructions only as starting points, and then add custom instructions that embody whatever principles are relevant to the particular fact pattern. But we're afraid that, in many instances, courts may just stick with the model instructions.
2z Circuits may want to consider creating more detailed instructions, or at least instructions that specifically direct trial courts to add appropriate details. At the very least, circuits should probably discourage instructions containing entirely subjective factors such as the fifth factor in the instruction above.
The answer to all these questions may be that copyright is different, and that all First Amendment bets are therefore off. But we doubt that this is so, and we believe that the issues are certainly contestable enough to merit further investigation and assertion by lawyers.
V. CONCLUSION
If the Bose reasoning is right-and we think it probably is-then independent appellate review should help make copyright law somewhat clearer and more predictable. The "substantial similarity" test cries out for the elaboration that independent appellate review is generally thought to provide. We cannot promise dramatic improvements, but we think that, where speech restrictions are concerned, even modest clarification will help.
In any event, whether or not the Bose reasoning is right (and we agree that the matter is not free from doubt), Bose is the law, and we see no good justification for courts to ignore Bose's command in the copyright context.
226
Copyright law may be a permissible speech restriction, but it cannot claim a categorical exemption from all free speech concerns. The same First Amendment due process rules that apply to other substantively valid restrictions must, absent a very good reason, apply equally to copyright. 223 . Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985) . 224. Cf Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 122-24 (1969) (Black, J., concurring) (arguing that a rule was unconstitutionally vague, despite clarifying and narrowing constructions developed by appellate courts, when the jury instructions were based on the vague statutory language rather than on the clarifying construction); id. at 112-13 (majority opinion) (seeming to take a similar view); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 653 (1990) (holding that, in the Eighth Amendment context, where the vagueness doctrine is as toothy as in the free speech context, it is essential that the jurors be properly instructed regarding all facets of the sentencing process," and stating that "ilt is not enough to instruct the jury in the bare terms of [a test] that is unconstitutionally vague on its face").
225. This is just our suspicion. We hope that others will investigate the matter more fully. 226. Stare decisis does not prevent courts from adopting this approach, even if in the past they have reviewed substantial similarity findings only for clear error. See supra Section I.F.
